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Abstract
This paper presents SgxPectre Attacks that exploit the recently
disclosed CPU bugs to subvert the confidentiality and integrity of
SGX enclaves. Particularly, we show that when branch prediction of
the enclave code can be influenced by programs outside the enclave,
the control flow of the enclave program can be temporarily altered
to execute instructions that lead to observable cache-state changes.
An adversary observing such changes can learn secrets inside the
enclave memory or its internal registers, thus completely defeat-
ing the confidentiality guarantee offered by SGX. To demonstrate
the practicality of our SgxPectre Attacks, we have systematically
explored the possible attack vectors of branch target injection, ap-
proaches to win the race condition during enclave’s speculative
execution, and techniques to automatically search for code patterns
required for launching the attacks. Our study suggests that any
enclave program could be vulnerable to SgxPectre Attacks since
the desired code patterns are available in most SGX runtimes (e.g.,
Intel SGX SDK, Rust-SGX, and Graphene-SGX). Most importantly,
we have applied SgxPectre Attacks to steal seal keys and attesta-
tion keys from Intel signed quoting enclaves. The seal key can be
used to decrypt sealed storage outside the enclaves and forge valid
sealed data; the attestation key can be used to forge attestation
signatures. For these reasons, SgxPectre Attacks practically defeat
SGX’s security protection. This paper also systematically evaluates
Intel’s existing countermeasures against SgxPectre Attacks and
discusses the security implications.
1 INTRODUCTION
Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of micro-architectural
extensions available in recent Intel processors. It is designed to
improve the application security by removing the privileged code
from the trusted computing base (TCB). At a high level, SGX pro-
vides software applications shielded execution environments, called
enclaves, to run private code and operate sensitive data, where both
the code and data are isolated from the rest of the software systems.
Even privileged software such as the operating systems and hyper-
visors are not allowed to directly inspect or manipulate the memory
inside the enclaves. Software applications adopting Intel SGX are
partitioned into sensitive and non-sensitive components. The sensi-
tive components run inside the SGX enclaves (hence called enclave
programs) to harness the SGX protection, while non-sensitive com-
ponents run outside the enclaves and interact with the system
software. In additional to memory isolation, SGX also provides
hardware-assisted memory encryption, remote attestation, and
cryptographically sealed storage to offer comprehensive security
guarantees.
Although SGX is still in its infancy, the promise of shielded
execution has encouraged researchers and practitioners to develop
various new applications to utilize these features (e.g., [2, 22, 51, 54,
59, 68, 69, 85, 88]), and new software tools or frameworks (e.g., [4,
5, 9, 24, 43, 50, 61, 65, 67, 72, 80]) to help developers adopt this
emerging programming paradigm. Most recently, SGX has been
adopted by commercial public clouds, such as Azure confidential
computing [58], aiming to protect cloud data security even with
compromised operating systems or hypervisors, or even “malicious
insiders with administrative privilege”.
In SGX, the CPU itself, as part of the TCB, plays a crucial role in
the security promises. However, the recently disclosed CPU vulner-
abilities due to the out-of-order and speculative execution [23] have
raised many questions and concerns about the security of SGX. Par-
ticularly, the so-called Meltdown [45] and Spectre attacks [42] have
demonstrated that an unprivileged application may exploit these
vulnerabilities to extract memory content that is only accessible to
privileged software. The developers have been wondering whether
SGX will hold its original security promises after the disclosure of
these hardware bugs [34]. It is therefore imperative to answer this
important question and understand its implications to SGX.
As such, we set off our study with the goal of comprehensively
understanding the security impact of these CPU vulnerabilities on
SGX. Our study leads to the SgxPectre Attacks, a new breed of the
Spectre attacks on SGX. At a high level, SgxPectre exploits the race
condition between the injected, speculatively executed memory
references, which lead to side-channel observable cache traces, and
the latency of the branch resolution. We coin a new name for our
SGX version of the Spectre attacks not only for the convenience
of our discussion, but also to highlight the important differences
between them, including the threat model, the attack vectors, the
techniques to win the race conditions, and the consequences of the
attacks. We will detail these differences in later sections.
SgxPectre Attacks are a new type of SGX side-channel attacks.
Although it has already been demonstrated that by observing ex-
ecution traces of an enclave program left in the CPU caches [7,
19, 21, 60], branch target buffers [44], DRAM’s row buffer con-
tention [77], page-table entries [74, 77], and page-fault exception
handlers [64, 82], a side-channel adversary with system privileges
may infer sensitive data from the enclaves, these traditional side-
channel attacks are only feasible if the enclave program already
has secret-dependent memory access patterns. In contrast, the con-
sequences of SgxPectre Attacks are far more concerning.
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Our findings.We show that SgxPectre Attacks completely com-
promise the confidentiality and integrity of SGX enclaves. In partic-
ular, because vulnerable code patterns exist in most SGX runtime
libraries (e.g., Intel SGX SDK, Rust-SGX, Graphene-SGX) and are
difficult to be eliminated, the adversary could perform SgxPectre
Attacks against any enclave programs. We demonstrate end-to-end
attacks to show that the adversary could learn the content of the
enclave memory as well as its register values from a victim en-
clave developed by enclave developers (i.e., independent software
vendors or ISVs).
A even more alarming consequence is that SgxPectre Attacks
can be leveraged to steal secrets belonging to Intel SGX platforms,
such as provisioning keys, seal keys, and attestation keys. For example,
we have demonstrated in an example that the adversary is able to
extract the seal keys of an enclave (or all enclaves belonging to
the same ISV) when the key is being used. With the extracted seal
key, our experiments suggest the enclave’s sealed storage can be
decrypted outside the enclave or even on a different machine; it
can be further modified and re-encrypted to deceive the enclave,
breaking both the confidentiality and integrity guarantees.
Besides enclaves developed by ISVs, Intel’s privately signed en-
claves (e.g., the provisioning enclave and quoting enclave) are also
vulnerable to SgxPectre Attacks. As SgxPectre Attacks have em-
powered a malicious OS to arbitrarily read enclave memory at any
given time, any secrets provisioned by Intel’s provisioning service
(e.g., the attestation key) can be leaked as long as they temporarily
appear in the enclave memory. We have demonstrated that Sgx-
Pectre Attacks are able to read memory from the quoting enclave
developed by Intel and extract Intel’s seal key, which can be used
to decrypt the sealed EPID blob to extract the attestation key (i.e.,
EPID private key).
Security implications. Intel’s solutions to SgxPectre Attacks are
twofold: First, Intel has released a microcode update (i.e., indirect
branch restricted speculation, or IBRS) to prevent branch injection
attacks. Our experiments shows that IBRS could cleanse the branch
prediction history at the enclave boundary, thus rendering our
SgxPectre Attacks ineffective. Second, Intel’s remote attestation
service, which arbitrates every attestation request from the ISV,
responses to the attestation signatures generated from unpatched
CPUs with an error message indicating outdated CPU security
version number (CPUSVN).
Nevertheless, the security implications are as follows: First, any
secret allowed to be provisioned to an unpatched processor can be
leaked, which includes secrets provisioned before the microcode up-
date and secrets provisioned without attestation. Second, the EPID
private key used for remote attestation can be extracted by the
attacker, which allows the attacker to emulate an enclave environ-
ment entirely outside the enclave while providing a valid (though
outdated) signature.
Responsible disclosure.We have disclosed our study to the secu-
rity team at Intel before releasing our study to the public. The tool
for scanning vulnerabilities in enclave code has been open sourced.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contributions.
• Systematic studies of a timely issue.We provide the first compre-
hensive exploration of the impacts of the recent micro-architect-
ural vulnerabilities on the security of SGX.
• New techniques to enable SGX attacks. We develop several new
techniques that enable attacks against any enclave programs,
including symbolic execution of SDK runtime binaries for vul-
nerability detection and combination of various side-channel
techniques for winning the race conditions.
• The first attack against Intel signed enclaves. To the best of our
knowledge, the attacks described in this paper are the first to
extract Intel secrets (i.e., attestation keys) from Intel signed
quoting enclaves.
• Security implications for SGX. Our study concludes that SGX
processors with these hardware vulnerabilities are no longer
trustworthy, urging the enclave developers to add vulnerability
verification into their development.
Roadmap. Sec. 2 introduces key concepts of Intel processor micro-
architectures to set the stage of our discussion. Sec. 3 discusses
the threat model. Sec. 4 presents a systematic exploration of at-
tack vectors in enclaves and techniques that enable practical at-
tacks. Sec. 5 presents a symbolic execution tool for automatically
searching instruction gadgets in enclave programs. Sec. 6 shows
end-to-end SgxPectre Attacks against enclave runtimes that lead
to a complete breach of enclave confidentiality. Sec. 7 discusses
and evaluates countermeasures against the attacks. Sec. 8 discusses
related work and Sec. 9 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Intel Processor Internals
Out-of-order execution.Modern CPUs implement deep pipelines,
so that multiple instructions can be executed at the same time.
Because instructions do not take equal time to complete, the order
of the instructions’ execution and their order in the program may
differ. This form of out-of-order execution requires taking special
care of instructions whose operands have inter-dependencies, as
these instructions may access memory in orders constrained by the
program logic. To handle the potential data hazards, instructions are
retired in order, resolving any inaccuracy due to the out-of-order
execution at the time of retirement.
Speculative execution. Speculative execution shares the same
goal as out-of-order execution, but differs in that speculation is
made to speed up the program’s execution when the control flow
or data dependency of the future execution is uncertain. One of
the most important examples of speculative execution is branch
prediction.When a conditional or indirect branch instruction is met,
because checking the branch condition or resolving branch targets
may take time, predictions aremade, based on its history, to prefetch
instructions first. If the prediction is true, speculatively executed
instructions may retire; otherwise mis-predicted execution will be
re-winded. The micro-architectural component that enables spec-
ulative execution is the branch prediction unit (BPU), which con-
sists of several hardware components that help predict conditional
branches, indirect jumps and calls, and function returns. For exam-
ple, branch target buffers (BTB) are typically used to predict indirect
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jumps and calls, and return stack buffers (RSB) are used to predict
near returns. These micro-architectural components, however, are
shared between software running on different security domains (e.g.,
user space vs. kernel space, enclave mode vs. non-enclave mode),
thus leading to the security issues that we present in this paper.
Implicit caching. Implicit caching refers to the caching of memory
elements, either data or instructions, that are not due to direct
instruction fetching or data accessing. Implicit caching may be
caused in modern processors by “aggressive prefetching, branch
prediction, and TLBmiss handling” [30]. For example, mis-predicted
branches will lead to the fetching and execution of instructions, as
well as data memory reads or writes from these instructions, that
are not intended by the program. Implicit caching is one of the root
causes of the CPU vulnerabilities studied in this paper.
2.2 Intel SGX
Intel SGX is a hardware extension in recent Intel processors aim-
ing to offer stronger application security by providing primitives
such as memory isolation, memory encryption, sealed storage, and
remote attestation. An important concept in SGX is the secure
enclave. An enclave is an execution environment created and main-
tained by the processor so that only applications running in it have
a dedicated memory region that is protected from all other soft-
ware components. Both confidentiality and integrity of the memory
inside enclaves are protected from the untrusted system software.
Entering and exiting enclaves. To enter the enclave mode, the
software executes the EENTER leaf function by specifying the ad-
dress of Thread Control Structure (TCS) inside the enclave. TCS
holds the location of the first instruction to execute inside the en-
clave. Multiple TCSs can be defined to support multi-threading
inside the same enclave. Registers used by the untrusted program
may be preserved after EENTER. The enclave runtime needs to de-
termine the proper control flow depending on the register values
(e.g., differentiating ECall from ORet).
Asynchronous Enclave eXit (AEX).When interrupts, exceptions,
and VM exits happen during the enclave mode, the processor will
save the execution state in the State Save Area (SSA) of the current
enclave thread, and replace it with a synthetic state to prevent in-
formation leakage. After the interrupts or exceptions are handled,
the execution will be returned (through IRET) from the kernel to
an address external to enclaves, which is known as Asynchronous
Exit Pointer (AEP). The ERESUME leaf function will be executed to
transfer control back to the enclave by filling the RIP with the copy
saved in the SSA.
CPU security version. Intel SGX uses a CPU Security Version
Number (CPUSVN) to reflect the processor’s microcode update ver-
sion, and considers all SGX implementations with older CPUSVN to
be untrustworthy. Whenever security vulnerabilities are fixed with
microcode patches, the CPUSVN will be updated.
Sealed storage. Enclaves can encrypt and integrity-protect some
secrets via a process, called sealing, to store the secrets outside the
enclave, e.g., on a non-volatile memory. The encryption key used
during the sealing process, is called the seal key, which is derived via
EGETKEY instruction. A CPUSVN has to be specified when deriving
a seal key. While it is allowed to derived seal keys with CPUSVNs
older than current CPUSVN to access legacy sealed secrets, deriving
seal keys with newer CPUSVN is forbidden to prevent attack such
as rolling back the microcode to a vulnerable version to steal the
secrets sealed with newer CPUSVN.
Remote Attestation. SGX remote attestation is used by enclaves
to prove to the ISV (i.e., the enclave developer) that a claimed en-
clave is running inside an SGX enabled processor. An anonymous
signature scheme, called Intel Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID), is used to
produce the attestation signature, which could be verified later by
the Intel attestation service. The attestation key (i.e., EPID private
key) cannot be directly accessed by an attested enclave, otherwise
a malicious enclave could generate any valid attestation signature
to deceive the remote party. Hence, Intel issues two privileged
enclaves, called the Provisioning Enclave (PvE) and the Quoting
Enclave (QE) to manage the attestation key and sign attestation
data. Specifically, the provisioning enclave communicates with Intel
provisioning service to obtain an attestation key and seals it on a
non-volatile memory; the quoting enclave could unseal the sealed
attestation key and produce attestation signature on behalf of an
attested enclave. Note that during the attestation process, Intel at-
testation service could also verify the CPUSVN of the SGX platform
running the attested enclave, and notify the ISV if the CPUSVN is
outdated.
2.3 Cache Side Channels
Cache side channels leverage the timing difference between cache
hits and cache misses to infer the victim’s memory access patterns.
Typical examples of cache side-channel attacks are Prime-Probe
and Flush-Reload attacks. In Prime-Probe attacks [1, 37, 48, 53, 55,
56, 70, 86], by pre-loading cache lines in a cache set, the adversary
expects that her future memory accesses (to the same memory)
will be served by the cache, unless evicted by the victim program.
Therefore, cache misses will reveal the victim’s cache usage of
the target cache set. In Flush-Reload attacks [3, 6, 20, 83, 84, 87],
the adversary shares some physical memory pages (e.g., through
dynamic shared libraries) with the victim. By issuing clflush on
certain virtual address that are mapped to the shared pages, the
adversary can flush the shared cache lines out of the entire cache
hierarchy. Therefore, Reloads of these cache lines will be slower
because of cache misses, unless they have been loaded by the victim
into the cache. In these ways, the victim’s memory access patterns
can be revealed to the adversary.
3 THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we consider an adversary with the system privilege of
the machine that runs on the processor with SGX support. Specifi-
cally, we assume the adversary has the following capabilities.
• Complete OS Control: We assume the adversary has complete
control of the entire OS, including re-compiling of the OS kernel
and rebooting of the OS with arbitrary argument as needed.
• Interacting with the targeted enclave:We assume the adversary is
able to launch the targeted enclave programwith a software pro-
gram under her control. This means the arguments of ECalls
and return values of OCalls are both controlled by the adver-
sary.
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Figure 1: A simple example of SgxPectre Attacks. The gray
blocks represent code or data outside the enclave. The white
blocks represent enclave code or data.
• Launching and controlling another enclave: we assume the adver-
sary is able to run another enclave that she completely controls
in the same process or another process. This implies that the en-
clave can poison any BTB entries used by the targeted enclave.
The goal of the attack is to learn the memory content inside
the enclave. We assume the binary code of the targeted enclave
program is already known to the adversary and does not change
during the execution. Therefore, we assume that the adversary is
primarily interested in learning the secret data inside the enclaves
after the enclave has been initialized (e.g., generating secrets from
random values or downloading secrets from the enclave owners.)
4 SGXPECTRE ATTACKS
4.1 A Simple Example
The basic idea of an SgxPectre Attack is illustrated in Figure 1.
There are 5 steps in an SgxPectre Attack:
Step ❶ is to poison the branch target buffer, such that when the
enclave program executes a branch instruction at a specific address,
the predicted branch target is the address of enclave instructions
that may leak secrets. For example, in Fig. 1, to trick the ret instruc-
tion at address 0x02560 in the enclave to speculatively return to
the secret-leaking instructions located at address 0x07642, the code
to poison the branch prediction executes an indirect jump from the
source address 0x02560 to the target address 0x07642multiple times.
We will discuss branch target injection in more details in Sec. 4.2.
Step ❷ is to prepare for a CPU environment to increase the
chance of speculatively executing the secret-leaking instructions
before the processor detects the mis-prediction and flushes the
pipeline. Such preparation includes flushing the victim’s branch
target address (to delay the retirement of the targeted branch in-
struction or return instruction) and depleting the RSB (to force the
CPU to predict return address using the BTB). Flushing branch tar-
gets cannot use the clflush instruction, as the enclave memory is
not accessible from outside (We will discuss alternative approaches
in Sec. 4.5). The code for depleting the RSB (shown in Fig. 1) pushes
the address of a ret instructions 16 times and returns to itself
repeatedly to drain all RSB entries.
Step ❸ is to set the values of registers used by the speculatively
executed secret-leaking instructions, such that they will read en-
clave memory targeted by the adversary and leave cache traces that
the adversary could monitor. In this simple example, the adversary
sets r14 to 0x106500, the address of a 2-byte secret inside the en-
clave, and sets r15 to 0x610000, the base address of a monitored
array outside the enclave. The enclu instruction with rax=2 is ex-
ecuted to enter the enclave. We will discuss methods to pass values
into the enclaves in Sec. 4.3.
Step ❹ is to actually run the enclave code. Because of the BTB
poisoning, instructions at address 0x07642 will be executed specu-
latively when the target of the ret instruction at address 0x02560 is
being resolved. The instruction “movzwq (%r14), %rbx” loads the
2-byte secret data into rbx, and “mov (%r15, %rbx, 1), %rdx”
touches one entry of the monitored array dictated by the value of
rbx.
Step❺ is to examine the monitored array using a Flush-Reload
side channel and extract the secret values. Techniques to do so are
discussed in details in Sec. 4.4.
4.2 Injecting Branch Targets into Enclaves
The branch prediction units in modern processors typically consists
of:
• Branch target buffer:When an indirect jump/call or a conditional
jump is executed, the target address will be cached in the BTB.
The next time the same indirect jump/call is executed, the target
address in the BTB will be fetched for speculative execution.
Modern x86-64 architectures typically support 48-bit virtual
address and 40-bit physical address [30, 39]. For space efficiency,
many Intel processors, such as Skylake, uses the lower 32-bit of
a virtual address as the index and tag of a BTB entry.
• Return stack buffer: When a near Call instruction with non-
zero displacement1 is executed, an entry with the address of
the instruction sequentially following it will be created in the
return stack buffer (RSB). The RSB is not affected by far Call,
far Ret, or Iret instructions. Most processors that implement
RSB have 16 entries [17]. On Intel Skylake or later processors,
when RSB underflows, BTBs will be used for prediction instead.
Poisoning BTBs from outside. To temporarily alter the control-
flow of the enclave code by injecting branch targets, the adversary
needs to run BTB poisoning code outside the targeted enclave,
which could be done in one of the following ways (as illustrated in
Fig. 2).
1Call instructions with zero displacement will not affect the RSB, because they are
common code constructions for obtaining the current RIP value. These zero displace-
ment calls do not have matching returns.
4
Figure 2: Poisoning BTB from the Same Process or A Differ-
ent Process
• Branch target injection from the same process. The adversary
could poison the BTB by using code outside the enclave but in
the same process. Since the BTB uses only the lower 32 bits of
the source address as BTB indices and tags, the adversary could
reserve a 232 = 4GB memory buffer, and execute an indirect
jump instruction (within the buffer) whose source address (i.e.,
0x7fff00002560) is the same as the branch instruction in the tar-
get enclave (i.e., 0x02560) in the lower 32 bits, and target address
(i.e., 0x7fff00007642) is the same as the secret-leaking instruc-
tions (i.e., 0x07642) inside the target enclave in the lower 32 bits.
• Branch target injection from a different process. The adversary
could inject the branch targets from a different process. Al-
though this attack method requires a context switch in between
of the execution of the BTB poisoning code and targeted enclave
program, the advantage of this method is that the adversary
could encapsulate the BTB poisoning coding into another en-
clave that is under his control. This allows the adversary to
perfectly shadow the branch instructions of the targeted en-
clave program (i.e., matching all bits in the virtual addresses).
It is worth noting that address space layout randomization can
be disabled by adversary to facilitate the BTB poisoning attacks. On
a Lenovo Thinkpad X1 Carbon (4th Gen) laptop with an Intel Core
i5-6200U processor (Skylake), we have verified that for indirect
jump/call, the BTB could be poisoned either from the same process,
or a different process. For the return instructions, we only observed
successful poisoning using a different process (i.e., perfect branch
target matching). To force return instructions to use BTB, the RSB
needs to be depleted before executing the target enclave code. Inter-
estingly, as shown in Fig. 1, a near call is made in enclave_entry,
which could have filled the RSB, but we still could inject the return
target of the return instruction at 0x02560 with BTB. We speculate
that this is a architecture-specific implementation. A more reliable
way to deplete the RSB is through the use of AEX as described in
Sec. 6.1.
4.3 Controlling Registers in Enclaves
Because all registers are restored by hardware after ERESUME, the
adversary is not able to control any registers inside the enclave
when the control returns back to the enclave after an AEX. In
contrast, most registers can be set before the EENTER leaf function
and remain controlled by the adversary after entering the enclave
mode until modified by the enclave code. Therefore, the adversary
Figure 3: EENTER and ECall Table Lookup
might have a chance to control some registers in the enclave after
an EENTER.
The SGX developer guide [31] defines ECall and OCall to spec-
ify the interaction between the enclave and external software. An
ECall, or “Enclave Call”, is a function call to enter enclave mode; an
OCall, or “Outside Call”, is a function call to exit the enclave mode.
Returning from an OCall is called an ORet. Both ECalls and ORets
are implemented through EENTER by the SGX SDK. As shown in
Fig. 3, the function enter_enclave is called by the enclave entry
point, enclave_entry. Then depending on the value of the edi
register, do_ecall or do_oret will be called. The do_ecall func-
tion is triggered to call trts_ecall and get_function_address
in a sequence and eventually look up the Ecall table. Both Ecall
and ORet can be exploited to control registers in enclaves.
4.4 Leaking Secrets via Side Channels
The key to the success of SgxPectre Attacks lies in the artifact that
speculatively executed instructions trigger implicit caching, which
is not properly rewinded when these incorrectly issued instructions
are discarded by the processor. Therefore, these side effects of
speculative execution on the CPU caches can be leveraged to leak
information from inside the enclave.
Cache side-channel attacks against enclave programs have been
studied recently [7, 19, 21, 60], all of which demonstrated that
a program runs outside the enclave may use Prime-Probe tech-
niques [70] to extract secrets from the enclave code, only if the en-
clave code has secret-dependent memory access patterns. Though
more fine-grained and less noisy, Flush-Reload techniques [84]
cannot be used in SGX attacks because enclaves do not share mem-
ory with the external world.
Different from these studies, however, SgxPectre Attacks may
leverage these less noisy Flush-Reload side channels to leak in-
formation. Because the enclave code can access data outside the
enclave directly, an SgxPectre Attack may force the speculatively
executed memory references inside enclaves to touch memory lo-
cation outside the enclave, as shown in Figure 1. The adversary
can flush an array of memory before the attack, such as the array
from address 0x610000 to 0x61ffff, and then reload each entry and
measure the reload time to determine if the entry has been touched
by the enclave code during the speculative execution.
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Figure 4: Best scenarios forwining a race condition.Memory
accesses D1, I1, D2, D3 are labeled next to the related instruc-
tions. The address translation and data accesses are illus-
trated on the right: The 4 blocks on top denote the units hold-
ing the address translation information, including TLBs,
paging structures, caches (for PTEs), and the memory; the 4
blocks at the bottom denote the units holding data/instruc-
tion. The shadow blocks represent the units from which the
address translation or data/instruction access are served.
Other than cache side-channel attacks, previous work has demon-
strated BTB side-channel attacks, TLB side-channel attacks, DRAM-
cache side-channel attacks, and page-fault attacks against enclaves.
In theory, some of these venues may also be leveraged by SgxPec-
tre Attacks. For instance, although TLB entries used by the enclave
code will be flushed when exiting the enclave mode, a Prime-Probe-
based TLB attack may learn that a TLB entry has been created in
a particular TLB set when the program runs in the enclave mode.
Similarly, BTB and DRAM-cache side-channel attacks may also
be exploitable in this scenario. However, page-fault side channels
cannot be used in SgxPectre Attacks because the speculatively
executed instructions will not raise exceptions.
4.5 Winning a Race Condition
At the core of an SgxPectre Attack is a race between the execution
of the branch instruction and the speculative execution: data leak-
age will only happen when the branch instruction retires later than
the speculative execution of the secret-leaking code. Fig. 4 shows a
desired scenario for wining such a race condition in an SgxPectre
Attack: The branch instruction has one data access D1, while the
speculative execution of the secret-leaking code has one instruction
fetch I1 and two data accesses D2 and D3. To win the race condition,
the adversary should ensure that the memory accesses of I1, D2
and D3 are fast enough. However, because I1 and D2 fetch memory
inside the enclave, and as TLBs and paging structures used inside
the enclaves are flushed at AEX or EEXIT, the adversary could at
best perform the address translation of the corresponding pages
from caches (i.e., use cached copies of the page table). Fortunately, it
can be achieved by performing the attack Step ❹ in Fig. 1 multiple
times. It is also possible to preload the instructions and data used
in I1 and D2 into the L1 cache to further speed up the speculative
execution. As D3 accesses memory outside the enclave, it is possible
to preload the TLB entry of the corresponding page. However, data
of D3 must be loaded from the memory.
Meanwhile, the adversary should slow down D1 by forcing its
address translation and data fetch to happen in the memory. How-
ever, this step has been proven technically challenging. First, it
is difficult to effectively flush the branch target (and the address
translation data) to memory without using clflush instruction.
Second, because the return address is stored in the stack frames,
which is very frequently used during the execution, evicting return
addresses must be done frequently. In the attack described in Sec. 6,
we leveraged an additional page fault to suspend the enclave execu-
tion right before the branch instruction and flush the return target
by evicting all cache lines in the same cache set.
5 ATTACK GADGETS IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we show that any enclave programs developed with
existing SGX SDKs are vulnerable to SgxPectre Attacks. In partic-
ular, we have developed an automated program analysis tool that
symbolically executes the enclave code to examine code patterns in
the SGX runtimes, and have identified those code patterns in every
runtime library we have examined, including Intel’s SGX SDK [35],
Graphene-SGX [9], Rust-SGX [14]. In this section, we present how
we search these gadgets in greater detail.
5.1 Types of Gadgets
In order to launch SgxPectre Attacks, two types of code patterns
are needed. The first type of code patterns consists of a branch
instruction that can be influenced by the adversary and several
registers that are under the adversary’s control when the branch
instruction is executed. The second type of code patterns consists
of two memory references sequentially close to each other and
collectively reveals some enclave memory content through cache
side channels. Borrowing the term used in return-oriented pro-
gramming [62] and Spectre attacks [42], we use gadgets to refer to
these patterns. More specifically, we name them Type-I gadgets and
Type-II gadgets, respectively.
5.1.1 Type-I gadgets: branch target injection. Unlike the typical
ROP gadget, we consider a gadget to be just a sequence of instruc-
tions that are executed sequentially during one run of the enclave
program and they may not always be consecutive in the memory
layout. A Type-I gadget is such an instruction sequence that starts
from the entry point of EENTER (dubbed enclave_entry) and ends
with one of the following instructions: (1) near indirect jump, (2)
near indirect call, or (3) near return. EENTER is the only method for
the adversary to take control of registers inside enclaves. During
an EENTER, most registers are preserved by the hardware; they are
left to be sanitized by the enclave software. If any of these registers
are not overwritten by the software before one of the three types
of branch instructions are met, a Type-I gadget is found.
An example of a Type-I gadget is shown in Listing 1, which is
excerpted from libsgx_trts.a of Intel SGX SDK. In particular,
line 49 in Listing 1 is the first return instruction encountered by an
enclave program after EENTER. When this near return instruction is
executed, several registers can still be controlled by the adversary,
including rbx, rdi, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r14, and r15.
Gadget exploitability. The exploitability of a Type-I gadget is
determined by the number of registers that are controlled (both
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1 0000000000003662 < enc l av e_en t r y > :
2 3 6 6 2 : cmp $0x0 ,% rax
3 3 6 6 6 : j n e 3709 < en c l a v e _ en t r y +0xa7 >
4 366 c : xor %rdx ,% rdx
5 366 f : mov %gs : 0 x8 ,% rax
6 3 6 7 6 : 00 00
7 3 6 7 8 : cmp $0x0 ,% rax
8 367 c : j n e 368 d < en c l a v e _ en t r y +0x2b >
9 367 e : mov %rbx ,% rax
10 3 6 8 1 : sub $0x10000 ,% rax
11 3 6 8 7 : sub $0x2b0 ,% rax
12 368 d : xchg %rax ,% r sp
13 368 f : push %rcx
14 3 6 9 0 : push %rbp
15 3 6 9 1 : mov %rsp ,% rbp
16 3 6 9 4 : sub $0x30 ,% r sp
17 3 6 9 8 : mov %rax ,−0 x8 (% rbp )
18 369 c : mov %rdx ,−0 x18 (% rbp )
19 36 a0 : mov %rbx ,−0 x20 (% rbp )
20 36 a4 : mov %r s i ,−0 x28 (% rbp )
21 36 a8 : mov %rd i ,−0 x30 (% rbp )
22 36 ac : mov %rdx ,% rcx
23 36 a f : mov %rbx ,% rdx
24 36 b2 : c a l l q 1 f 2 0 < en t e r _ en c l a v e >
25 . . .
26
27 0000000000001 f 2 0 < en t e r _ en c l a v e > :
28 1 f 2 0 : push %r13
29 1 f 2 2 : push %r12
30 1 f 2 4 : mov %r s i ,% r13
31 1 f 2 7 : push %rbp
32 1 f 2 8 : push %rbx
33 1 f 2 9 : mov %rdx ,% r12
34 1 f 2 c : mov %edi ,% ebx
35 1 f 2 e : mov %ecx ,% ebp
36 1 f 3 0 : sub $0x8 ,% r sp
37 1 f 3 4 : c a l l q b60 < s g x_ i s _ en c l a v e _ c r a s h ed >
38 . . .
39
40 0000000000000 b60 < s g x_ i s _ en c l a v e _ c r a s h ed > :
41 b60 : sub $0x8 ,% r sp
42 b64 : c a l l q 361 b < g e t _ e n c l a v e _ s t a t e >
43 . . .
44
45 000000000000361 b < g e t _ e n c l a v e _ s t a t e > :
46 361 b : l e a 0 x213886 (% r i p ) ,% r cx # 216 ea8 < g _ en c l a v e _ s t a t e >
47 3 6 2 2 : xor %rax ,% rax
48 3 6 2 5 : mov (% rcx ) ,% eax
49 3 6 2 7 : r e t q
Listing 1: An Example of a Type-I Gadget
directly or indirectly) by the adversary at the time of the execution
of the branch instruction. The more registers that are under control
of the adversary, the higher the exploitability of the gadget. Highly
exploitable Type-I gadgets mean less restriction on the Type-II
gadgets in the exploits.
5.1.2 Type-II gadgets: secret extraction. A Type-II gadget is a
sequence of instructions that starts from a memory reference in-
struction that loads data in the memory pointed to by register regA
into register regB, and ends with another memory reference in-
struction whose target address is determined by the value of regB.
When the control flow is redirected to a Type-II gadget, if regA is
controlled by the adversary, the first memory reference instruction
will load regB with the value of the enclave memory chosen by
the adversary. Because the entire Type-II gadget is speculatively
executed and eventually discarded when the branch instruction in
the Type-I gadget retires, the secret value stored in regBwill not be
learned by the adversary directly. However, as the second memory
reference will trigger the implicit caching, the adversary can use a
Flush-Reload side channel to extract the value of regB.
An example of a Type-II gadget is illustrated in Listing 2, which
is excerpted from the libsgx_tstdc.a library of Intel SGX SDK.
1 0000000000005 c10 < d l f r e e > :
2 . . .
3 607 f : mov 0 x38 (% r s i ) ,% e d i
4 6 0 8 2 : mov %rd i ,% r cx
5 6 0 8 5 : l e a (% rbx ,% rd i , 8 ) ,% r d i
6 6 0 8 9 : cmp 0 x258 (% r d i ) ,% r s i
7 . . .
Listing 2: An Example of a Type-II Gadget
Assuming rsi is a register controlled by the adversary, the first
instruction (line 3) reads the content of memory address pointed
to by rsi+0x38 to edi. Then the value of rbx+rdi×8 is stored in
rdi (line 5). Finally, the memory address at rdi+0x258 is loaded
to be compared with rsi (line 6). To narrow down the range of
rdi+0x258, it is desired that rbx is also controlled by the adversary.
We use regC to represent these base registers like rbx.
Gadget exploitability. The exploitability of a Type-II gadget is
determined by two factors: First, whether there exists a register
regC that serves as the base address of the secondmemory reference.
Having such a register makes the attack much easier, because the
range of the second memory references can be controlled by the
adversary. Second, the number of instructions between the two
memory references. Because speculative execution only lasts for a
very short time, only a few instructions can be executed. The fewer
instructions there are in the gadget, the higher its exploitability is.
5.2 Symbolically Executing SGX Code
Although a skillful attacker can manually read the source code or
even the disassembled binary code of the enclave program, SGX
SDKs, or the runtime libraries to identify usable gadgets for ex-
ploitation, such an effort is very tedious and error-prone. It is highly
desirable to leverage automated software tools to scan an enclave
binary to detect any exploitable gadgets, and eliminate the gadgets
before deploying them to the untrusted SGX machines.
To this end, we devise a dynamic symbolic execution technique
to enable automated identification of SgxPectre Attack gadgets.
Symbolic execution [41] is a program testing and debugging tech-
nique in which symbolic inputs are supplied instead of concrete
inputs. Symbolic execution abstractly executes a program and con-
currently explores multiple execution paths. The abstract execution
of each execution path is associated with a path constraint that
represents multiple concrete runs of the same program that satisfy
the path conditions. Using symbolic execution techniques, we can
explore multiple execution paths in the enclave programs to find
gadgets of SgxPectre Attacks.
More specifically, we leverage angr [66], a popular binary anal-
ysis framework to perform the symbolic execution. During the
simulated execution of a program, machine states are maintained
internally in angr to represent the status of registers, stacks, and the
memory; instructions update the machine states represented with
symbolic values while the execution makes forward progress. We
leverage this symbolic execution feature of angr to enumerate exe-
cution paths and explore each machine state to identify the gadgets.
Symbolic execution of an enclave function. To avoid the path
explosion problem during the symbolic execution of a large en-
clave program (or a large SGX runtime such as Graphene-SGX),
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we design a tool built atop the angr framework, which allows the
user to specify an arbitrary enclave function to start the symbolic
execution. The exploration of an execution path terminates when
the execution returns to this entry function or detects a gadget.
To symbolically execute an SGX enclave binary, we have extended
angr to handle: (1) the EEXIT instruction, by putting the address of
the enclave entry point, enclave_entry, in the rip register of its
successor states; (2) dealing with instructions that are not already
supported by angr, such as xsave, xrstore, repz, and rdrand.
5.3 Gadget Identification
Identifying Type-I gadgets. The key requirement of a Type-I
gadget is that before the execution of the indirect jump/call or
near return instruction, the values of some registers are controlled
(directly or indirectly) by the adversary, which can only be achieved
via EENTER. We consider two types of Type-I gadget separately:
ECall gadgets and ORet gadgets.
To detect ECall gadgets, the symbolic execution starts from the
enclave_entry function and stops when a Type-I Gadget is found.
During the path exploration, edi register is set to a value that leads
to an ECall.
To detect ORet gadgets, the symbolic execution starts from a
user-specified function inside the enclave. Once an OCall is en-
countered, the control flow is transfered to enclave_entry and the
edi register is set to a value that leads to an ORet. At this point, all
other registers are considered controlled by the adversary and thus
are assigned symbolic values. An ORet gadget is found if an indirect
jump/call or near return instruction is encountered and some of the
registers still have symbolic values. The symbolic execution contin-
ues if no gadgets are found until the user-specified function finishes.
Identifying Type-II gadgets. To identify Type-II gadgets, our tool
scans the entire enclave binary and looks for memory reference
instructions (i.e., mov and its variants, such as movd and moveq) that
load register regB with data from the memory location pointed
to by regA. Both regA and regB are general registers, such as rax,
rbx, rcx, rdx, r8 - r15. Once one of such instructions is found, the
following N instructions (e.g., N = 10) are examined to see if there
exists another memory reference instruction (e.g., mov, cmp, add)
that accesses a memory location pointed to by register regD. If so,
the instruction sequence is a potential Type-II gadget. It is desired
to have a register regC used as the base address for the second
memory reference. However, we also consider gadgets that do not
involve regC, because they are also exploitable.
Once we have identified a potential gadget, it is executed sym-
bolically using angr. The symbolic execution starts from the first
instruction of a potential Type-II gadget, and regB and regC are
both assigned symbolic values. At the end of the symbolic execution
of the potential gadget, the tool checks whether regD contains a
derivative value of regB, and when regC is used as the base ad-
dress of the second memory reference, whether regC still holds its
original symbolic values. The potential gadget is a true gadget if
the checks pass. We use either [regA, regB, regC] or [regA, regB]
to represent a Type-II gadget.
5.4 Experimental Results of Gadget Detection
We run our symbolic execution tool on three well-known SGX
runtimes: the official Intel Linux SGX SDK (version 2.1.102.43402),
Graphene-SGX (commit bf90323), and Rust-SGX SDK (version 0.9.1).
In all cases, a minimal enclave with a single empty ECallwas devel-
oped. When the enclave binary becomes more complex (e.g., using
some library functions such as printf), the size of the resulting
enclave binary will grow to include more components of the SDK
libraries. Therefore, gadgets detected in a minimal enclave binary
will appear in any enclave code developed using these SDKs; Addi-
tional functionality will increase the number of available gadgets.
For example, a simple OCall implementation of printf introduces
three more Type-II gadgets. In addition, the code written by the
enclave author might also introduce extra exploitable gadgets.
To detect ECall Type-I Gadgets, the symbolic execution starts
from the enclave_entry function in all three runtime libraries. To
detect ORet Type-I gadgets, in Intel SGX SDK and Rust-SGX SDK,
we started our analysis from the sgx_ocall function, which is the
interface defined to serve all OCalls. In contrast, Graphene-SGXhas
more diverse OCalls sites. In total, there are 37 such sites as defined
in enclave_ocalls.c. Unlike in other cases where the symbolic
analysis completes instantly due to small function sizes, analyzing
these 37 OCalls sites consumes more time: the median running
time of analyzing one OCalls sites was 39 seconds; the minimum
analysis time was 8 seconds; and the maximum was 340 seconds.
The results for Type-I gadgets are summarized in Table 1 and
those for Type-II gadgets are listed in Table 3. More specifically, in
Table 1, column 2 shows the type of the gadget, whether it being
indirect jump, indirect call, or return; column 3 shows the address of
the branch instruction (basically the gadget’s end address. Note that
the Type-I gadget always starts at the enclave_entry.) represented
using the function name the instruction is located and its offset;
column 4 shows the registers that are under the control of the
adversary when the branch instructions are executed. For example,
the first entry in Table 1 shows an indirect jump gadget, which
is located in do_ecall (with an offset of 0x118). By the time of
the indirect jump, the registers that are still under the control of
adversary are rdi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r14 and r15.
Table 3 (in Appendix) lists Type-II gadgets of the form [regA,
regB, regC], which means at the time of memory reference, two
registers, regB and regC, are controlled by the adversary. Such
gadgets are easier to exploit. Column 2 shows the beginning address
of the gadgets, represented using the function name and offset
within the function; column 3 lists the entire gadgets. For most
of these gadgets, the number of instructions in the gadget is less
than 5. The shorter the gadgets are, the easier they can be exploited.
The Type-II gadgets of the form [regA, regB] were not listed in the
table, because there are too many. In total, we have identified 6, 86,
and 180 such gadgets in these three runtimes, respectively.
6 STEALING ENCLAVE SECRETS WITH
SGXPECTRE ATTACKS
In this section, we demonstrate end-to-end SgxPectre Attacks
against an arbitrary enclave programwrittenwith Intel SGX SDK [35],
because this is Intel’s official SDK. Rust-SGX was developed based
on the official SDK and thus can be exploited in the same way. For
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Category End Address Controlled Registers
Intel SGX SDK
indirect jump <do_ecall>:0x118 rdi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r14, r15
indirect call — —
return
<get_enclave_state>:0xc rbx, rdi, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<sgx_is_enclave_crashed>:0x16 rbx, rdi, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<get_thread_data>:0x9 rbx, rdi, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<_ZL16init_stack_guardPv>:0x21 rdi, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<do_ecall>:0x21 rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<enter_enclave>:0x62 rbx, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<restore_xregs>:0x2b rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r14, r15
<do_rdrand>:0x11 r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r14, r15
<sgx_read_rand>:0x46 rbx, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r14, r15
Graphene-SGX
indirect jump — —
indirect call <_DkGenericEventTrigger>:0x20 r9, r10, r11, r13, r14, r15
return
<_DkGetExceptionHandler>:0x30 rdi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<get_frame>:0x84 r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<_DkHandleExternelEvent>:0x55 rdi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<_DkSpinLock>:0x27 rbx, rdi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<sgx_is_within_enclave>:0x23 rdi, rsi, r8, r12, r13, r14
<handle_ecall>:0xcd rdi, rsi, r8
<handle_ecall>:0xd5 rdx, rdi, rsi, r8
Rust SGX SDK
indirect jump <do_ecall>:0x118 rdi, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
indirect call — —
return
<_ZL14do_init_threadPv>:0x109 rdi, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<do_ecall>:0x21 rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<do_ecall>:0x63 rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<_ZL16init_stack_guardPv>:0x21 rdi, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<_ZL16init_stack_guardPv>:0x69 rdi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<enter_enclave>:0x55 rbx, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<restore_xregs>:0x2b rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<elf_tls_info>:0xa0 rbx, rdx, rsi, r9, r10, r11, r14, r15
<get_enclave_state>:0xc rdx, rdi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r14, r15
<get_thread_data>:0x9 rbx, rdi, rsi, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15
<__morestack>:0xe r8, r9, r10, r11
<asm_oret>:0x64 r8, r9, r10, r11
<__memcpy>:0xa3 rax, rbx, rdi, r9, r10, r11, r14, r15
<__memset>:0x1d rax, rbx, rdx, rdi, r9, r10, r11, r14, r15
<__intel_cpu_features_init_body>:0x42b rbx, rdx, rdi, r9, r10, r11, r14, r15
Table 1: SgxPectre Attack Type-I Gadgets in Popular SGX Runtime Libraries.
Figure 5: Exploiting Intel SGX SDK. The blocks with dark
shadows represent instructions or data located in untrusted
memory. Blockswithout shadows are instructions inside the
target enclave or the .data segment of the enclave memory.
demonstration purposes, the enclave program we developed has
only one ECall function that runs in a busy loop. We verified that
our own code does not contain any Type-I or Type-II gadgets in
itself. The exploited gadgets, however, are located in the runtime
libraries of SDK version 2.1.102.43402 (compiled with gcc version
5.4.020160609), which are listed in Listing 1 and Listing 2. Experi-
ments were conducted on a Lenovo Thinkpad X1 Carbon (4th Gen)
laptop with an Intel Core i5-6200U processor and 8GB memory.
6.1 Reading Register Values
We first demonstrate an attack that enable the adversary to read
arbitrary register values inside the enclave. This attack is possible
because during AEX, the values of registers are stored in the SSA
before exiting the enclave. As the SSA is also a memory region
inside the enclave, the adversary could leverage the SgxPectre
Attacks to read the register values in the SSA during an AEX. This
attack is especially powerful as it allows the adversary to frequently
interrupt the enclave executionwith AEX [73] and take snapshots of
its SSAs to single-step trace its register values during its execution.
In particular, the attack is shown in Figure 5. In Step ➀, the tar-
geted enclave code is loaded into the enclave that is created by the
program controlled by the adversary. After EINIT, the malicious
program starts a new thread (denoted as the victim thread) to issue
EENTER to execute the enclave code. Our enclave code only runs in
a busy loop. But in reality, the enclave program might complete a
remote attestation and establish trusted communication with its
remote owner. In Step ➁, the adversary triggers frequent inter-
rupts to cause AEX from the targeted enclave. During an AEX, the
processor stores the register values into the SSA , exits the enclave
and invokes the system software’s interrupt handler. Before the
control is returned to the enclave program via ERESUME, the ad-
versary pauses the victim thread’s execution at the AEP, a piece
of instructions in the untrusted runtime library that takes control
after IRet.
In Step ➂, the main thread of the adversary-controlled pro-
gram sets (through a kernel module) the reserved bit in the PTE
of an enclave memory page that holds g_enclave_state, a global
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variable used by Intel SGX SDK to track the state of the enclave,
e.g., initialized or crashed states. As shown in Listing 1, this global
variable is accessed right before the ret instruction of the Type-I
gadget (i.e., the memory referenced by rcx in the instruction “mov
(%rcx),%eax”. In Step➃, the main thread poison the BTB, prepare
registers (i.e., rsi and rdi2), and executes EENTER to trigger the at-
tack. To poison the BTB, the adversary creates an auxiliary enclave
program in another process containing an indirect jump with the
source address equals the address of the return instruction in the
Type-I gadget, and the target address the same as the start address
of the Type-II gadget in the victim enclave. The process that runs
in the auxiliary enclave is pinned onto the same logical core as the
main thread. To trigger the BTB poisoning code, the main thread
calls sched_yield() to relinquish the logical core to the auxiliary
enclave program.
In Step ➄, after the main thread issues EENTER to get into the
enclave mode, the Type-I gadget will be executed immediately. Be-
cause a reserved bit in the PTE is set, a page fault is triggered when
the enclave code accesses the global variable g_enclave_state. In
the page fault handler, the adversary clears the reserved bit in the
PTE, evicts the stack frame that holds the return address of the ret
instruction from cache by accessing 2, 000 memory blocks whose
virtual addresses have the same lower 12-bits as the stack address.
The RSB is depleted right before ERESUME from the fault handling,
so that it will remain empty until the return instruction of Type-I
gadget is executed. In Step ➅, due to the extended delay of read-
ing the return address from memory, the processor speculatively
executes the Type-II gadget (as a result of the BTB poisoning and
RSB depletion). After the processor detects the mis-prediction and
flushes the speculatively executed instructions from the pipeline,
the enclave code continues to execute. However, because rdi is set
as a memory address in our attack, it is an invalid value for the
SDK as rdi is used as the index of the ecall_table. The enclave
execution will return with an error quickly after the speculative
execution. This artifact allows the adversary to repeatedly probe
into the enclaves. In Step ➆, the adversary uses Flush-Reload
techniques to infer the memory location accessed inside the Type-II
gadget. One byte of SSA can thus be leaked. The main thread then
repeats Step➂ to Step➆ to extract the remaining bytes of the SSA.
In our Type-I gadget, the get_enclave_state function is very
short as it contains only 4 instructions. Since calling into this func-
tion will load the stack into the L1 cache, it is very difficult to flush
the return address out of the cache to win the race condition. In fact,
our initial attempts to flush the return address all failed. Triggering
page faults to flush the return address resolves the issue. However,
directly introducing page faults in every stack access could greatly
increase the amount of time to carry out the attack. Therefore,
instead of triggering page faults on the stack memory, the page
fault is enforced on the global variable g_enclave_state which
is located on another page. In this way, we can flush the return
address with only one page fault in each run.
In our Type-II gadget, the first memory access reads 4 bytes (32
bits). It is unrealistic to monitor 232 possible values in the Flush-
Reload. However, if we know the value of lower 24 bits, we can
2Note that rbx will be set to rdi by the time the return instruction is executed (line 34
in Listing 1), in such a way we can control rsi and rbx when speculatively executing
Type-II gadget.
adjust the base of the second memory access (i.e., rbx) to map the
256 possible values of the highest 8 bits to the cache lines monitored
by the Flush-Reload code. Once all 32 bits of the targeted memory
are learned, the adversary shifts the target address by one byte to
learn the value of a new byte. We found in practice that it is not
hard to find the initial consecutively known bytes. For example, the
unused bytes in an enclave data page will be initialized as 0x00, as
they are used to calculate the measurement hash. Particularly, we
found that there are 4 reserved bytes (in the EXINFO structure) in
the SSA right before the GPRSGX region (which stores registers).
Therefore, we can start from the reserved bytes (all 0s), and extract
the GPRSGX region from the first byte to the last. As shown in
Fig. 5, all register values, including rax, rbx, rcx, rdx, r8 to r15,
rip, etc, can be read from the SSA very accurately. To read all
registers in the GPRSGX region (184 bytes in total), our current
implementation takes 414 to 3677 seconds to finish. On average,
each byte can be read in 6.6 seconds. We believe our code can be
further improved.
6.2 Stealing Intel Secrets
Reading other enclave memory follows exactly the same steps. The
primary constraint is that the attack is much more convenient if
three consecutive bytes are known. To read the .data segments,
due to data alignment, some bytes are reserved and initialized as
0s, which can be used to bootstrap the attack. In addition, some
global variables have limited data ranges, rendering most bytes
known. To read the stack frames, the adversary could begin with a
relatively small address which is likely unused and thus is known to
be initialized with 0xcc . In this way, the adversary can start reading
the stack frames from these known bytes. Next, we demonstrate
how to use these memory reading primitives to steal Intel secrets,
such as seal keys and attestation keys.
Extracting seal keys and decrypting sealed storage blob. The
adversary could use SgxPectre Attacks to read the seal keys from
the enclave memory when it is being used during sealing or un-
sealing operations. Particularly, in our demonstration, we targeted
Intel SDK API sgx_unseal_data() used for unsealing a sealed
blob. The sgx_unseal_data() API works as follows: firstly, it calls
sgx_get_key() function to generate the seal key from a pseudo-
random function inside the processor and then store it temporarily
on the stack in the enclave memory. Secondly, with the seal key,
it calls sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt() function to decrypt the
sealed blob. Finally, it clears the seal key (by setting the memory
range storing the seal key on the stack to 0s) and returns. Hence,
to read the seal key, the adversary suspends the execution of the
victim enclave when function sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt() is
being called, by setting the reserved bit of the PTE of the enclave
code page containing sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(). The ad-
versary then launches the SgxPectre Attacks to read the stack and
extract the seal key.
To decrypt the sealed blob, the adversary could exported the seal
key and then implement the AES-128-GCM decryption algorithm
by himself to decrypt the sealed blob with the seal key. This may
happen outside the enclave or on a different machine, because the
SGX hardware is no longer involved in the process.
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Extracting attestation key. After running the provisioning proto-
col with Intel’s provisioning service, the attestation key (i.e., EPID
private key) is created and then sealed in the EPID blob by the
provisioning enclave and stored on a non-volatile memory. Though
the location of the non-volatile memory is not documented, during
remote attestation, SGX still relies on the untrusted OS to pass the
sealed EPID blob into the quoting enclave. This offers the adversary
a chance to obtain the sealed EPID blob.
To decrypt the EPID blob and extract the attestation key, the
adversary could target the verify_blob() ECall function of the
quoting enclave which is used to verify the sealed EPID blob, sus-
pend its execution when sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt() is be-
ing called, and read the stack to obtain the quoting enclave’s seal
key. With this seal key, the attestation key can be decrypted in
similar ways as the aforementioned attack.
The primary difference in this attack is that it requires the ad-
versary to perform SgxPectre Attacks on Intel signed quoting
enclaves, rather than ISV’s enclaves. For a real attacker, these two
attacks are similar. But it made a big difference in our experiments
as Intel’s enclaves are developed and signed by Intel, which cannot
be altered. Nevertheless, we could perform the attack using the
same method described in the paper. One thing worth mentioning
is that the TCS numbers of the provisioning enclave and quoting
enclave are set to 1, which means the adversary has to use the same
TCS to enter the enclaves. Since the number of SSAs per TCS is 2,
which is designed to allow the victim to run some exception han-
dler within the enclave when the exception could not be resolved
outside the enclave during AEXs. However, this also enables the
adversary to EENTER into the enclave during an AEX, to launch the
SgxPectre Attack to steal the secrets being used by the victim.
After the attestation key is obtained, the adversary could use
this EPID private key to generate an anonymous group signature,
which means the adversary can now impersonate any machine in
the attestation group. Moreover, the adversary could also use the
attestation key completely outside the enclave and trick the ISVs to
believe their code runs inside an enclave.
7 COUNTERMEASURES
Hardware patches. To mitigate branch target injection attacks,
Intel has released microcode updates to support the following three
features [33].
• Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS): IBRS restricts the
speculation of indirect branches [36]. Software running in a
more privileged mode can set an architectural model-specific
register (MSR), IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS, to 1 by using the WRMSR
instruction, so that indirect branches will not be controlled by
software that was executed in a less privileged mode or by a
program running on the other logical core of the physical core.
By default, on machines that support IBRS, branch prediction in-
side the SGX enclave cannot be controlled by software running
in the non-enclave mode.
• Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP): STIBP prevents
branch target injection from software running on the neighbor-
ing logical core, which can be enabled by setting IA32_SPEC_
CTRL.STIBP to 1 by using the WRMSR instruction.
• Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB): IBPB is an indirect
branch control command that establishes a barrier to prevent
the branch targets after the barrier from being controlled by
software executed before the barrier. The barrier can be es-
tablished by setting the IA32_PRED_CMD.IBPB MSR using the
WRMSR instruction.
Particularly, IBPS provides a default mechanism that prevents
branch target injection. To validate the claim, we developed the
following tests: First, to check if the BTB is cleansed during EENTER
or EEXIT, we developed a dummy enclave code that trains the BTB
to predict address A for an indirect jump. After training the BTB,
the enclave code uses EEXIT and a subsequent EENTER to switch
the execute mode once and then executes the same indirect jump
but with address B as the target. Without the IBRS patch, the later
indirect jump will speculatively execute instructions in address A.
However, with the hardware patch, instructions in address A will
not be executed.
Second, to test if the BTB is cleansed during ERESUME, we de-
veloped another dummy enclave code that will always encounter
an AEX (executing a memory access to a specific address that will
trigger a page fault) right before an indirect call. In the AEP, another
BTB poisoning enclave code will be executed before ERESUME. With-
out the patch, the indirect call speculatively executed the secret-
leaking gadget. The attack failed after patching.
Third, to test the effectiveness of the hardware patch under
Hyper-Threading, we tried poisoning the BTB using a program
running on the logical core sharing the same physical core. The
experiment setup was similar to our end-to-end case study in Sec. 6,
but instead of pinning the BTB poisoning enclave code onto the
same logical core, we pinned it onto the sibling logical core. We
observed some secret bytes leaked before the patch, but no leakage
after applying the patch.
Therefore, from these tests, we can conclude that SGX machines
with microcode patch will cleanse the BTB during EENTER and dur-
ing ERESUME, and also prevent branch injection viaHyper-Threading,
thus they are immune to SgxPectre Attacks.
Retpoline. Retpoline is a pure software-based solution to Spectre
attacks [71], which has been developed for major compilers, such as
GCC [81] and LLVM [8]. The name “retpoline” comes from “return”
and “trampoline”. Because modern processors have implemented
separate predictors for function returns, such as Intel’s return stack
buffer [25–29] and AMD’s return-address stack [39], it is believed
that these return predictors are not vulnerable to Spectre attacks.
Therefore, the key idea of retpoline is to replace indirect jump or
indirect calls with returns to prevent branch target injection.
However, in recent Intel Skylake/Kabylake processors, on which
SGX is supported, when the RSB is depleted, the BPU will fall back
to generic BTBs to predict a function return. This allows poisoning
of return instructions. Therefore, Retpoline is useless by itself in
preventing SgxPectre Attacks.
Defenses by Intel’s attestation service. After applying the mi-
crocode patch, the processor is immune to SgxPectre Attacks. But
unpatched processors remain vulnerable. The key to the security
of the SGX ecosystem is whether attestation measurements and
signatures from processors without the IBRS patch can be detected
during remote attestation. As discussed in Sec. 2, the CPUSVN is
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Result Description Trustworthy
OK EPID signature was verified correctly and the
TCB level of the SGX platform is up-to-date.
Yes
SIGNATURE_INVALID EPID signature was invalid. No
GROUP_REVOKED EPID group has been revoked. No
SIGNATURE_REVOKED EPID private key used has been revoked by
signature.
No
KEY_REVOKED EPID private key used has been directly re-
voked (not by signature).
No
SIGRL_VERSION_MISMATCH SigRL version does not match the most re-
cent version of the SigRL.
No
GROUP_OUT_OF_DATE EPID signature was verified correctly, but the
TCB level of SGX platform is outdated.
Up to ISV
Table 2: Attestation Results [32]
used to derive attestation keys (indirectly) and seal keys, and also
provided to the attestation service; microcode update will also up-
grade CPUSVN. As a consequence, any attestation key and seal key
generated before the microcode update will not be trustworthy
afterwards. Moreover, Intel’s attestation service, which arbitrates
every attestation request from the ISV, responses to the attestation
signatures generated from unpatched CPUs with an error message
indicating outdated CPUSVN.
Summary. The combination of the IBPS patch and defenses by
Intel’s attestation service has been an effective defense against
SgxPectre Attacks. However, there are several caveats: First, any
secret that is allowed to be provisioned to an unpatched processor
can be leaked. This includes secrets in ISV enclaves that are provi-
sioned before remote attestation, or after remote attestation if the
ISV chooses to ignore the error message returned by the attestation
service. Moreover, because the ISV enclave’s seal key can be com-
promised by SgxPectre Attacks, any secret sealed by an enclave
run on unpatched processor can be decrypted by the adversary.
Furthermore, any legacy sealed secrets become untrustworthy, as
they could be forged by the adversary using the stolen seal key.
Second, as shown in Sec. 6.2, the EPID private key used in the
remote attestation can be extracted by the attacker. Given the anony-
mous attestation protocol [38] used by Intel, the attacker can pro-
vide a valid signature for any SGX processors in the group. With
the attestation key, it is also possible for the attacker to run the
enclave code entirely outside the enclave and forge a valid signature
to fool the ISV. Therefore, an error message during attestation with
GROUP_OUT_OF_DATE means the enclave is completely untrusted,
rather than replying on ISV to decide (see Table 2). We recommend
Intel to make the message very clear to the ISVs.
Due to the severity of SgxPectre Attacks, we urge the enclave
authors to specify the minimum CPUSVN during their development.
It is important never accept attestation from processors with out-
dated CPUSVN. Moreover, we also suggest developers of runtime
libraries (such as SGX SDKs) to scrutinize their code to remove
exploitable gadgets in prevention of other potential ways of poison-
ing the BTB in the future. The symbolic execution tool presented
in this paper can be used to look for these gadgets. Type-II gadgets
can be removed by adding lfense in between of the two memory
references. But the performance loss needs to be evaluated as [regA,
regB] Type-II gadgets are very common in the runtimes. Type-I
gadgets are harder to be eliminated, as it requires almost all regis-
ters to be sanitized after EENTER and before the control flows reach
any indirect branch instructions or near returns.
8 RELATEDWORK
Meltdown and Spectre attacks. Our work is closely related to
the recently demonstrated Spectre attacks [23, 42]. There are two
variants of Spectre attacks: bounds check bypass and branch target
injection. The first variant targets the conditional branch prediction
and the second targets the indirect jump target prediction. A variety
of attack scenarios have been demonstrated, including cross-process
memory read [42], kernel memory read from user process, and
host memory read from KVM guests [23]. However, their security
implications on SGX enclaves have not been studied. In contrast, in
this paper we have systematically investigated the enclave security
on vulnerable SGX machines, devised new techniques to enable
attacks against any enclave programs developed with Intel SGX
SDK, and examined the effectiveness of various countermeasures.
Meltdown attacks [45] are another micro-architectural side-chan-
nel attacks that exploit implicit caching to extract secret memory
content that is not directly readable by the attack code. Different
from Spectre attacks, Meltdown attacks leverage the feature of out-
of-order execution to execute instructions that should have not
been executed. An example given by Lipp et al. [45] showed that an
unprivileged user program could access an arbitrary kernel memory
element and then visit a specific offset in an attacker-controlled
data array, in accordance with the value of the kernel memory
element, to load data into the cache. Because of the out-of-order
execution, instructions after the illegal kernel memory access can
be executed and then discarded when the kernel memory access
instruction triggers an exception. However, due to implicit caching,
the access to the attacker-controlled data array will leave traces in
the cache, which will be captured by subsequent Flush-Reload
measurements. Similar attacks can be performed to attack Xen
hypervisor when the guest VM runs in paravirtualization mode [45].
However, we are not aware of any demonstrated Meltdown attacks
against SGX enclaves.
Micro-architectural side channels in SGX. The SgxPectre At-
tacks are variants of micro-architectural side-channel attacks. Pre-
viously, various micro-architectural side-channel attacks have been
demonstrated on SGX, which CPU cache attacks [7, 19, 21, 60],
BTB attacks [44], page-table attacks [64, 74, 82], cache-DRAM at-
tacks [77], etc. SgxPectre Attacks are different because they target
memory content inside enclaves, while previous attacks aim to
learn secret-dependent memory access patterns. However, SgxPec-
tre Attacks leverage techniques used in these side-channel attacks
to learn “side effects” of speculatively executed enclave code.
Side-channel defenses. Existing countermeasures to side-channel
attacks can be categorized into three classes: hardware solutions,
system solutions, and application solutions. Hardware solutions [12,
15, 47, 49, 78, 79] require modification of the processors, which
are typically effective, but are limited in that the time window
required to have major processor vendors to incorporate them in
commercial hardware is very long. System solutions only modify
system software [40, 46, 75, 89], but as they require trusted system
software, they cannot be directly applied to SGX enclaves.
Application solutions are potentially applicable to SGX. Previous
work generally falls into three categories: First, using compiler-
assisted approaches to eliminate secret-dependent control flows
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and data flows [11, 52, 64], or to diversify or randomize memory ac-
cess patterns at runtime to conceal the true execution traces [13, 57].
However, as the vulnerabilities in the enclave programs that enable
SgxPectre Attacks are not caused by secret-dependent control
or data flows, these approaches are not applicable. Second, using
static analysis or symbolic execution to detect cache side-channel
vulnerabilities in commodity software [16, 76]. However, these ap-
proaches model secret-dependent memory accesses in a program;
they are not applicable in the detection of the gadgets used in our at-
tacks. Third, detecting page-fault attacks or interrupt-based attacks
against SGX enclave using Intel’s hardware transactional mem-
ory [10, 18, 63]. These approaches can be used to detect frequent
AEX, but still allowing secret leaks in SgxPectre Attacks.
9 CONCLUSION
We have presented SgxPectre Attacks that are able to extract the
Intel secrets such as the seal keys and attestation keys from the
SGX enclaves. To demonstrate their practicality, we systematically
explored the possible vectors of branch target injection, approaches
to win the race condition during enclave’s speculative execution,
and techniques to automatically search for code patterns required
for launching the attacks. We also demonstrated a number of prac-
tical attacks against an arbitrary enclave program written with
Intel SGX SDK, which not only extracts the secrets in the enclave
memory, but also the registers used only in the enclave mode.
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10 APPENDIX
Due to space constraints, we list all [regA, regB, regC] Type-II
gadgets of the three SGX runtimes, e.g., Intel SGX SDK, Graphene-
SGX, and Rust-SGX SDK, in Table 3. The numbers of [regA, regB]
Type-II gadgets are too large to be included in the paper.
15
Start Address Gadget Instructions
Intel SGX SDK
<dispose_chunk>:0x8a mov 0x38(%rsi),%r9d; mov %r9,%rcx; lea (%rdi,%r9,8),%r9; cmp 0x258(%r9),%rsi
<dispose_chunk>:0x299 mov 0x38(%r8),%r9d; mov %r9,%rcx; lea (%rdi,%r9,8),%r9; cmp 0x258(%r9),%r8
<dlmalloc>:0x180b mov 0x38(%rdx),%r12d; mov %r12,%rcx; add $0x4a,%r12; cmp 0x8(%rsi,%r12,8),%rdx
<dlfree>:0x399 mov 0x38(%r8),%edi; mov %rdi,%rcx; lea (%rbx,%rdi,8),%rdi; cmp 0x258(%rdi),%r8
<dlfree>:0x46f mov 0x38(%rsi),%edi; mov %rdi,%rcx; lea (%rbx,%rdi,8),%rdi; cmp 0x258(%rdi),%rsi
<dlrealloc>:0x341 mov 0x38(%rsi),%r10d;mov %r10,%rcx;lea (%rbx,%r10,8),%r10;cmp %rsi,0x258(%r10)
Graphene-SGX
<do_lookup_map>:0x97 mov 0x2f0(%r8),%rax; mov (%rax,%rdx,4),%eax
<do_lookup_map>:0x177 mov 0x2d0(%r8),%rax; mov (%rax,%rdx,4),%r15d
<do_lookup_map>:0x200 mov 0x2d8(%r8),%rax; mov (%rax,%r15,4),%r15d
<mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign>:0x98 mov 0x10(%r12),%rcx; movslq %r9d,%rdi; mov %rdi,%rsi; imul (%rcx,%rdx,8),%rsi
<mbedtls_mpi_get_bit>:0x13 mov 0x10(%rdi),%rax;mov %rsi,%rdx;mov %esi,%ecx;shr $0x6,%rdx;mov (%rax,%rdx,8),%rax
<mbedtls_mpi_set_bit>:0x32 mov 0x10(%r12),%rax; mov %r13,%rcx; and $0x3f,%ecx; shl %cl,%rbx; lea (%rax,%r14,8),%rdx; mov $0xfffffffffffffffe,%rax; rol
%cl,%rax; and (%rdx),%rax
<mbedtls_mpi_shift_l>:0x4a mov 0x10(%r13),%rdx; sub %rbx,%rax; lea (%rdx,%rax,8),%rax; mov -0x8(%rax),%rcx
<mbedtls_mpi_shift_l>:0x8a mov 0x10(%r13),%rsi; mov $0x40,%edi; mov %r12d,%r8d; sub %r12d,%edi; xor %eax,%eax; mov (%rsi,%rbx,8),%rdx
<mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs>:0x7c mov 0x10(%rdi),%rax; mov -0x8(%rax,%rdx,8),%rdi
<mpi_montmul.isra.3>:0xa0 mov 0x10(%r15),%rdx; mov (%r14),%rsi; mov -0x58(%rbp),%rdi; mov (%rdx,%r13,8),%r8
<mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi>:0x91 mov 0x10(%rdi),%rcx; mov -0x8(%rcx,%rdx,8),%rsi
<mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi>:0x100 mov 0x10(%r13),%rax; mov %r11,%rdx; add 0x10(%rbx),%rdx; mov 0x10(%r12),%rsi; mov %r14,%rdi; mov (%rax,%r11,1),%rcx
<mbedtls_mpi_mod_int>:0x37 mov 0x10(%rsi),%r11; xor %ecx,%ecx; mov -0x8(%r11,%r10,8),%r9
<mbedtls_mpi_write_string>:0x129 mov 0x10(%r14),%rax; lea 0x0(,%rdx,8),%ecx; mov (%rax,%r8,1),%rax
<mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc>:0x108 mov 0xc(%rbx),%edi; add $0x4,%r8; add $0x10,%rbx; mov %rdi,%rdx; movzbl %dh,%edx; movzbl (%rsi,%rdx,1),%ecx
<mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc>:0x1e8 mov 0x1c(%rbx),%r8d; add $0x20,%rbx; add $0x4,%rdi; mov %r8,%rdx; movzbl %dh,%edx; movzbl (%rsi,%rdx,1),%r9d
<mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc>:0x238 mov -0x14(%rbx),%edx; mov %ecx,(%rbx); xor -0x1c(%rbx),%ecx; mov %ecx,0x4(%rbx); xor -0x18(%rbx),%ecx; xor
%ecx,%edx; mov %ecx,0x8(%rbx); movzbl %dl,%ecx; mov %edx,0xc(%rbx); movzbl (%rsi,%rcx,1),%r9d
<mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc>:0x2c8 mov 0x14(%rbx),%edi; add $0x18,%rbx; add $0x4,%r8; mov %rdi,%rdx; movzbl %dh,%edx; movzbl (%rsi,%rdx,1),%ecx
Rust-SGX SDK
<dispose_chunk>:0x8a mov 0x38(%rsi),%r9d; mov %r9,%rcx; lea (%rdi,%r9,8),%r9; cmp 0x258(%r9),%rsi
<dispose_chunk>:0x299 mov 0x38(%r8),%r9d; mov %r9,%rcx; lea (%rdi,%r9,8),%r9; cmp 0x258(%r9),%r8
<try_realloc_chunk.isra.2>:0x1eb mov 0x38(%rsi),%r9d; mov %r9,%rcx; lea (%r12,%r9,8),%r9; cmp 0x258(%r9),%rsi
<dlmalloc>:0x180b mov 0x38(%rdx),%r12d; mov %r12,%rcx; add $0x4a,%r12; cmp 0x8(%rsi,%r12,8),%rdx
<dlfree>:0x391 mov 0x38(%r8),%edi; mov %rdi,%rcx; lea (%rbx,%rdi,8),%rdi; cmp 0x258(%rdi),%r8
<dlfree>:0x467 mov 0x38(%rsi),%edi; mov %rdi,%rcx; lea (%rbx,%rdi,8),%rdi; cmp 0x258(%rdi),%rsi
Table 3: SgxPectre Attack Type-II Gadgets in Popular SGX Runtimes.
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